Anselm's Monologion chapters 59-63

Index

Chapter 59 The Father and the Son and their Spirit exist equally in one another
Chapter 60 No one of them needs the other for remembering, understanding, or loving—because each, distinctly, is Memory, Understanding, Love, and whatever else must be present in the Supreme Being
Chapter 61 Nevertheless, there are not three fathers, or three sons or three spirits but one father, one son, and one spirit common to them
Chapter 62 How from these (the Father, the Son, and their Spirit) many sons seem to be begotten
Chapter 63 How in the Supreme Spirit there is only one son and one who has a son.




LatinEnglish
59. QUOD PATER ET FILIUS ET EORUM SPIRITUS PARITER SINT IN SE INVICEM. 59. The Father and the Son and their Spirit exist equally in one another.
Iucundum est intueri in patre et filio et utriusque spiritu, quomodo sint in se invicem tanta aequalitate, ut nullus alium excedat. Praeter hoc enim quia unusquisque illorum sic est perfecte summa essentia, ut tamen omnes tres simul non sint nisi una summa essentia, quae nec sine se vel extra se nec maior vel minor seipsa esse potest: per singulos tamen idipsum non minus valet probari. It is a most interesting consideration that the Father, and the Son, and the Spirit of both, exist in one another with such equality that no one of them surpasses another. For, not only is each in such a way the perfectly supreme Being that, nevertheless, all three at once exist only as one supreme Being, but the same truth is no less capable of proof when each is taken separately.
Est etenim totus pater in filio et communi spiritu, et filius in patre et eodem spiritu, et idem spiritus in patre et filio, quia memoria summae essentiae tote est in eius intelligentia et in amore, et intelligentia in memoria et in amore, et amor in memoria et intelligentia. Totam quippe suam memoriam summus spiritus intelligit et amat, et totius intelligentiae meminit et totem amat, et totius amoris meminit et totum intelligit. For the Father exists as a whole in the Son, and in the Spirit common to them; and the Son in the Father, and in the Spirit; and the Spirit in the Father, and in the Son; for the memory of the supreme Being exists, as a whole, in its intelligence and in its love, and the intelligence in its memory and love, and the love in its memory and intelligence. For the supreme Spirit conceives of (intelligit) its memory as a whole, and loves it, and remembers its intelligence as a whole, and loves it as a whole, and remembers its love as a whole, and conceives of it as a whole.
Intelligitur autem in memoria pater, in intelligentia filius, in amore utriusque spiritus. Tanta igitur pater et filius et utriwque spiritus aequalitate sese complectuntur et sunt in se invicem, ut eorum nullus alium excedere aut sine eo esse probetur. But we mean by the memory, the Father; by the intelligence, the Son; by the love, the Spirit of both. In such equality, therefore, do Father and Son and Spirit embrace one another, and exist in one another, that none of them can be proved to surpass another or to exist without it.
60. QUOD NULLUS EORUM ALIO INDIGEAT AD MEMORANDUM vel INTELLIGENDUM VEL AMANDUM, QUIA SINGULUS QUISQUE EST MEMORIA ET INTELLIGENTIA ET AMOR ET QUIDQUID NECESSE EST INESSE SUMMAE ESSENTIAE. 60. No one of them needs the other for remembering, understanding, or loving—because each, distinctly, is Memory, Understanding, Love, and whatever [else] must be present in the Supreme Being.
Sed in his nullatenw negligenter memoriae commendandum, quod intuenti mihi occurrit, existimo. Sic enim necesse est ut pater intelligatur memoria, filius intelligentia, spiritus amor: ut nec pater indigeat filio aut communi spiritu, nec filius patre vel eodem spiritu, sive idem spiritus patre aut filio, quasi pater per se meminisse solum possit, intelligere autem non nisi per filium, et amare non nisi per snum filIique spiritum; et filius per se intelligere tantum,queat, per patrem autem memor sit, et per spiritum soum amet; et idem spiritus per se non aliud quam amare valeat. sed pater illi sit memor, et filius illi intelligat. But, while this discussion engages our attention, I think that this truth, which occurs to me as I reflect, ought to be most carefully commended to memory. The Father must be so conceived of as memory, the Son as intelligence, and the Spirit as love, that it shall also be understood that the Father does not need the Son, or the Spirit common to them, nor the Son the Father, or the same Spirit, nor the Spirit the Father, or the Son: as if the Father were able, through his own power, only to remember, but to conceive only through the Son, and to love only through the Spirit of himself and his son; and the Son could only conceive or understand (intelligere) through himself, but remembered through the Father, and loved through his Spirit; and this Spirit were able through himself alone only to love, while the Father remembers for him, and the Son conceives or understands (intelligit) for him.
Nam cum in his /71/ tribus unusquisque singulus sit summa essentia et summa sapientia sic perfecta, ut ipsa per se memor sit et intelligat et amet: necesse est ut nullus horum trium alio indigeat aut ad memorandum aut ad intelligendum aut ad amandum. Singulus enim quisque essentialiter est et memoria et intelligentia et amor et quidquid summae essentiae necesse est inesse. For, since among these three each one taken separately is so perfectly the supreme Being and the supreme Wisdom that through himself he remembers and conceives and loves, it must be that none of these three needs another, in order either to remember or to conceive or to love. For, each taken separately is essentially memory and intelligence and love, and all that is necessarily inherent in the supreme Being
61. QUOD TAMEN NON SINT TRES SED UNUS SEU PATER SEU FILIUS SIVE UTRIUSQUE SPIRITUS. 61. Nevertheless, there are not three [fathers, or three sons or three spirits] but one father, one son, and one spirit common to them.
Quandam hic video quaestionem occurrere. Nam si pater ita est intelligentia et amor, sicut est memoria; et filius sic est memoria et amor, quamodo est intelligentia; et utriusque spiritus non minw est memoria et intelligentia quam amor: quomodo non est pater filius et alicuius spiritus; et quare non est filius pater et spiritus alicuius; et cur non est idem spiritus alicuius pater et alicuius filius? Sic quippe intelligebatur quod memoria esset pater, filius intelligentia, utriusque spiritus amor. And here, I see, a question arises. For, if the Father is intelligence and love as well as memory, and the Son is memory and love as well as intelligence, and the Spirit is no less memory and intelligence than love; how is it that the Father is not a Son and a Spirit of some being? and why is not the Son the Father and the Spirit of some being? and why is not this Spirit the Father of some being, and the Son of some being? For it was understood, that the Father was memory, the Son intelligence, and the Spirit love.
Verum haec quaestio non difficile solvitur, si ea quae iam ratione inventa sunt, considerentur. Idcirco enim non est pater filius aut alterius spiritus, licet sit intelligentia et amor, quia non est intelligentia genita aut amor ab aliquo procedens; sed quidquid est, gignens est tantum, et a quo procedit alius. But this question is easily answered, if we consider the truths already disclosed in our discussion. For the Father, even though he is intelligence and love, is not for that reason the Son or the Spirit of any being; since he is not intelligence, begotten of any, or love, proceeding from any, but whatever he is, he is only the begetter, and is he from whom the other proceeds.
Filius quoque ideo non est pater aut alicuius spiritus, quamvis seipso et memor sit et amet, quia non est memoria gignens aut amor ab alio ad similitudinem sui spiritus procedens; sed quidquid existit, tantum gignitur, et est a quo spiritus procedit. The Son also, even though by his own power he remembers and loves, is not, for that reason, the Father or the Spirit of any; since he is not memory as begetter, or love as proceeding from another after the likeness of his Spirit, but whatever being he has he is only begotten and is he from whom the Spirit proceeds.
Spiritum quoque non cogit esse patrem aut filium hoc quia contentus est memoria aut intelligentia sua, cum non sit memoria gignens aut intelligentia genita; sed /72/ solum quidquid est procedat. The Spirit, too, is not necessarily Father or Son, because his own memory and intelligence are sufficient to him; since he is not memory as begetter, or intelligence as begotten, but he alone, whatever he is, proceeds or emanates.
Quid igitur prohibet concludi quia unus tantum est in summa essentia pater, unus filius, unus spiritus, et non tres patres aut filii aut spiritus? What, then, forbids the conclusion that in the supreme Being there is only one Father, one Son, one Spirit, and not three Fathers or Sons or Spirits?
62. QUOMODO EX HIS MULTI FILLI NASCI VIDEANTUR. 62. How from these [viz., the Father, the Son, and their Spirit] many sons seem to be begotten.
Sed ne forte repugnet huic assertioni quod intueor. Nam dubium esse non debet, quia pater et filius et eorum spiritus unusquisque seipsum et alios ambos dicit, sicut se et alios intelligit. Quod si ita est: quomodo non sunt in summa essentia tot verba, quot sunt dicentes et quot sunt qui dicuntur? But perhaps the following observation will prove inconsistent with this assertion. It should not be doubted that the Father and the Son and their Spirit each expresses himself and the other two, just as each conceives of, and understands, himself and the other two. But, if this is true, are there not in the supreme Being as many words as there are expressive beings, and as many words as there are beings who are expressed?
Si enim plures homines unum aliquid cogitatione dicant: tot eius videntur esse verba, quot sunt cogitantes, quia in singulorum cogitationibus verbum eius est. Item si unus homo cogitet plura aliqua, tot verba sunt in mente cogitantis, quot sunt res cogitatae. For, if more men than one give expression to some one object in thought, apparently there are as many words corresponding to that object as there are thinkers; since the word corresponding to it exists in the thoughts of each separately. Again, if one man thinks of more objects than one, there are as many words in the mind of the thinker as there are objects thought of.
Sed in hominis cogitatione cum cogitat aliquid quod extra eius mentem est, non nascitur verbum cogitatae rei ex ipsa re, quoniam ipsa absens est a cogitationis intuitu sed ex rei aliqua similitudine vel imagine quae est in cogitantis memoria, aut forte quae tunc cum cogitat per corporeum sensum ex re praesenti in mentem attrahitur. But in the thought of a man, when he thinks of anything outside his own mind, the word corresponding to the object thought of is not born of the object itself, since that is absent from the view of thought, but of some likeness or image of the object which exists in the memory of the thinker, or which is perhaps called to mind through a corporeal sense from the present object itself.
In summa vero essentia sic sibi semper sunt praesentes pater et filius et eorum spiritus -- est enim, sicut iam perspectum est, unusquisque non minus in aliis quam in seipso -- ut cum invicem se dicunt, sic videatur idem ipse qui dicitur gignere verbum snum, quemadmodum cum a seipso dicitur. Quomodo ergo nihil gignit filius aut eius patrisque spiritus, si unusquisque eorum verbum suum gignit, cum a se dicitur vel ab alio? Quot autem verba probari possunt de summa nasci substantia, tot eam necesse est secundum superiorem considerationem filios gignere, et tot emittere /73/ spiritus. But in the supreme Being, Father and Son and their Spirit are always so present to one another—for each one, as we have already seen, exists in the others no less than in himself—that, when they express one another, the one that is expressed seems to beget his own word, just as when he is expressed by himself. How is it, then, that the Son and the Spirit of the Son and of the Father beget nothing, if each begets his own word, when he is expressed by himself or by another? Apparently as many words as can be proved to be born of the supreme Substance, so many Sons, according to our former reasoning, must there be begotten of this substance, and so many spirits proceeding from it.
Hac itaque ratione videntur in illa esse non solum multi patres et filii et procedentes sed et aliae necessitudines. On these grounds, therefore, there apparently are in that Being, not only many fathers and sons and beings proceeding from it, but other necessary attributes as well.
63. QUOMODO NON SIT IBI NISI UNUS UNIUS. 63. How in the Supreme Spirit there is only one son and one who has a son.
Aut certe pater et filius et eorum spiritus de quibus iam certissimum est quia vere existunt, non sunt tres dicentes, quamvis singulus quisque sit dicens; nec sunt plura quae dicuntur, cum unusquisque seipsum et alios duos dicit. Or else Father and Son and their Spirit, of whom it is already certain that they truly exist, are not three expressive beings, although each taken separately is expressive, nor are there more beings than one expressed, when each one expresses himself and the other two.
Sicut enim summae sapientiae inest scire et intelligere, ita utique aeternae incommutabilisque scientiae et intelligentiae naturale est semper id praesens intueri, quod scit et intelligit. Nihil autem aliod est summo spiritui huiusmodi dicere quam quasi cogitando intueri, sicut nostrae mentis locutio non aliud est quam cogitantis inspectio. For, just as it is an inherent property of the supreme Wisdom to know and conceive, so it is assuredly natural to eternal and immutable knowledge and intelligence ever to regard as present what it knows and conceives of. For, to such a supreme Spirit expressing and beholding through conception, as it were, are the same, just as the expression of our human mind is nothing but the intuition of the thinker.
Certissimum autem iam consideratae rationes reddiderunt: quidquid summae naturae inest essentialiter, id perfecte convenire patri et filio et eorum spiritui s singulatim; et tamen idipsum, si simul dicatur de tribus, non admittere pluralitatem. Cum ergo constet quia, sicut pertinet ad eius essentiam scientia et intelligentia, sic eius scire et intelligere non est aliud quam dicere, id est semper praesens intueri quod scit et intelligit: necesse est ut, quemadmodum singulus pater et singulus filius et singulus eorum spiritus est sciens et intelligens, et tamen hi tres simul non sunt plures scientes aut intelligentes sed unus sciens, unus intelligens: ita singulus quisque sit dicens, nec tamen omnes simul tres dicentes sed unus dicens. But reasons already considered have shown most convincingly that whatever is essentially inherent in the supreme Nature is perfectly consistent with the nature of the Father and the Son and their Spirit taken separately; and that, nevertheless, this, if attributed to the three at once, does not admit of plurality. Now, it is established that as knowledge and intelligence are attributes of his being, so his knowing and conceiving is nothing else than his expression, that is, his ever beholding as present what he knows and conceives of. Necessarily, therefore, just as the Father separately, and the Son separately, and their Spirit separately, is a knowing and conceiving being, and yet the three at once are not more knowing and conceiving beings than one, but one knowing and one conceiving being: so, each taken separately is expressive, and yet there are not three expressive beings at once, but one expressive being.
Hinc illud quoque liquide cognosci potest quia, cum hi tres dicuntur vel a seipsis 4uel ab invicem, non sunt plura quae dicuntur. Quid namque ibi dicitur nisi eorum essentia? Si ergo illa una sola est, unum solum est quod dicitur. Ergo si unum est in illis quod dicit, et unum quod dicitur -- una quippe sapientia est quae in illis dicit, et una substantia quae dicitur -- consequitur non ibi esse plura verba sed unum. Licet igitur unusquisque /74/ seipsum et omnes invicem se dicant, impossibile tamen est esse in summa essentia verbum aliud praeter illud de quo iam constat, quod sic nascitur ex eo cuius est.uerbum, ut et vera eius dici possit imago et vere filius eius sit. Hence, this fact may also be clearly recognised, that when these three are expressed, either by themselves or by another, there are not more beings than one expressed. For what is therein expressed except their being? If, then, that Being is one and only one, then what is expressed is one and only one; therefore, if it is in them one and only one which expresses, and one which is expressed—for it is one wisdom which expresses and one substance which is expressed—it follows that there are not more words than one, but one alone. Hence, although each one expresses himself and all express one another, nevertheless there cannot be in the supreme Being another Word than that already shown to be born of him whose is the Word, so that it may be called his true image and his Son.
In quo mirum quiddam et inexplicabile video. Ecce enim cum manifestum sit unumquemque, scilicet patrem et filium et patris filiique spiritum, pariter se et ambos altos dicere, et unum solum ibi esse verbum: nullatenus tamen ipsum verbum videtur posse dici verbum omnium trium sed tantum unius eorum. And in this truth I find a strange and inexplicable factor. For observe: although it is manifest that each one, that is, Father and Son, and the Spirit of Father and Son equally expresses himself and both the others, and that there is one Word alone among them; yet it appears that this Word itself can in no wise be called the Word of all three, but only of one.
Constat enim ipsum esse imaginem et filium eius cuius est verbum; et pates quia nec imago nec filius suimet aut a se procedentis spiritus congrue dici potest. Nam nec ex seipso nec ex procedente a se nascitur, nec seipsum aut procedentem a se existendo imitatur. Seipsum quippe non imitatur nec a se trahit existendi similitudinem, quia imitatio et similitudo non est in uno solo sed in pluribus. Illum vero non imitatur nec ad eius similitudinem existit, quia iste non habet ab illo esse sed ille ab isto. Restat igitur hoc solum verbum illius solius esse de quo nascendo habet esse, et ad cuius omnimodam similitudinem existit. For it has been proved that it is the image and Son of him whose Word it is. And it is plain that it cannot properly be called either the image or son of itself, or of the Spirit proceeding from it. For, neither of itself nor of a being proceeding from it, is it born, nor does it in its existence imitate itself or a being proceeding from itself. For it does not imitate itself, or take on a like existence to itself, because imitation and likeness are impossible where only one being is concerned, but require plurality of beings; while it does not imitate the spirit, nor does it exist in his likeness, because it has not its existence from that Spirit, but the Spirit from it. It is to be concluded that this sole Word corresponds to him alone, from whom it has existence by generation, and after whose complete likeness it exists.
Unus ergo pater, non plures patres, unus filius, non plures filii, unus procedens spiritus, non plures procedentes spiritus sunt in summa essentia. Qui cum ita tres sint ut numquam pater sit filius aut procedens spiritus, nec filius aliquando sit pater aut spiritus procedens, nec umquam spiritus patris et filii sit pater aut filius; et singulus quisque sic sit perfectus, ut nullo indigeat: id tamen quod sunt sic est unum, ut sicut de singulis pluraliter dici non potest, ita nec de tribus simul. Et cum pariter unusquisque seipsum et omnes invicem se dicant: non tamen sunt ibi plura verba sed unum; et ipsum non singulorum aut omnium simul sed unius tantum. One Father, then, and not more than one Father; one Son, and not more than one Son; one Spirit proceeding from them, and not more than one such Spirit, exist in the supreme Being. And, although there are three, so that the Father is never the Son or the Spirit proceeding from them, nor the Son at any time the Father or the Spirit, nor the Spirit of Father and Son ever the Father or the Son; and each separately is so perfect that he is self-sufficient, needing neither of the others; yet what they are is in such a way one that just as it cannot be attributed to them taken separately as plural, so, neither can it be attributed to them as plural, when the three are taken at once. And though each one expresses himself and all express one another, yet there are not among them more words than one, but one; and this Word corresponds not to each separately, nor to all together, but to one alone.




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